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1. Three Types of Degree of Belief or Evidential Support. 
Inquiring and deliberating agents discriminate between conjectures with respect to the 
degrees of belief or disbelief.  The conjectures are potential answers to a question under 
investigation identified by the inquirer and judged to be serious possibilities consistent with the 
inquirer’s current state of full belief. 
I shall not attempt a comprehensive survey of all the diverse notions of degree of 
confidence, degree of belief or the like that have been proposed for drawing fine grained 
distinctions between seriously possible conjectures.  I shall focus on just three: 
(1) Degrees of Credal Probability: 
(2) Degrees of Belief in the Maximizing Sense. 
(3) Degrees of Belief in the Satisficing Sense. 
It is commonly held that a rational agent ought to accord degrees of belief to seriously 
possible conjectures that are supported by the agent’s state of full belief.  If we are to take this 
commonplace on board, its force must be carefully understood.   
If inquirer X is in state of full belief K at time t, X is committed at t to distinguishing 
between seriously possible doxastic propositions consistent with K accessible to X and doxastic 
propositions accessible to X that X is committed to ruling out as not seriously possible.  According 
to X at t, X’s state of full belief supports the seriously possible propositions to varying degrees.  
That is to say, at t X is committed to a standard of evidential support relative to K as well as a 
standard for assigning degrees of belief relative to K.  The commonplace requires as a condition 
of rational coherence that X should believe the seriously possible propositions to degrees that are 
equal to their degrees of evidential support. 
Insofar as we should take this commonplace as gospel while acknowledging the 
distinction between three senses of belief to a degree, we should acknowledge three distinct 
notions of evidential support: support for degrees of credal probability, for degrees of belief in the 
maximizing sense and for degrees of belief in the satisficing sense. 
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Should we endorse the commonplace?  I shall return this question later. 
2. Credal Probability, Confirmational Commitments and States of Full Belief. 
Credal or subjective or personal probability has an undoubtedly important significance for 
practical deliberation.  It is used to determine the expected values of options in decision-making.  
To be sure, this expectation-determining function cannot always insure that agents are in a 
position to maximize expected utility.  Credal probabilities (and, indeed, utilities as well) may well 
go indeterminate so that even when choosing between a finite set of options, there may be no 
option that maximizes expected utility.  But indeterminate states of credal probability judgment 
can always be represented by sets of credal probability functions so that one can consider a set 
of expected utility functions for the available options and recommend restricting choice to the E-
admissible options.  These are the options that are best according to at least one permissible 
expected utility for realizing the goals of the decision-maker (i.e., at least one permissible 
probability-utility of payoffs pair).  Hence, even in the case of indeterminacy, the expectation-
determining role of credal states remains important. 
Until the last half of the 20th century, those who considered credal probability thought X’s 
state of credal probability at a given time ought to be determined by X’s state of full belief in 
accordance with a methodological rule that specified for each potential state of full belief K in a 
domain of (conceptually) accessible potential states of full belief Φ the appropriate credal state B 
that X should have.  Such a rule can be represented by a function C: Φ -> Π where Π is the 
domain of credal states and Φ is the domain of accessible states of full belief.1   
                                                 
1 A conceptual framework is a set Φ of accessible potential states of full belief constituting a Boolean algebra closed under 
meets of subsets of Φ of any cardinality less than or equal to that of Φ. (Levi, 1991.)  The accessible potential states in the 
framework may also be called doxastic propositions.  A framework Φ may have maximally consistent potential states 
according to Φ.  But these atoms can always be refined further thereby enlarging the framework.  Hence, these atoms do 
not qualify as total theories of possible worlds.  The framework deployed in characterizing changes in states of full belief 
and their justification depends on the range of problems and issues being covered.  KT is the weakest element of 
framework Φ and K⊥ the strongest. The potential states accessible according to a framework Φ should be distinguished 
from the set Ψ of accessible potential states that are also relevant answers to some set of questions.  Let LK be some 
element of Φ that is stronger than KT and let the basic partition ULK be a set of accessible potential states such that LK has 
as a consequence that exactly one element of ULK is true and each element of ULK is consistent with LK.  The set Ψ of 
relevant potential answers consists of all Boolean combinations of ULK (including meets of cardinality up to the cardinality 
of Ψ and all accessible states equivalent given LK to such Boolean combinations.)  We suppose that the inquirer’s current 
state of full belief K is an expansion of LK belonging to Φ.  Insofar as the inquirer is concerned with the question 
characterized by ULK, attention is restricted to consequences of K in Ψ.  K divides the relevant potential states of full belief 
or potential answers in Ψ into serious possibilities and impossibilities.  The ultimate partition UK relative to K is the subset 
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According to this view (with which I am sympathetic), a rational inquirer takes credal 
probability to be a function of his or her state of full belief.  In a generous sense of “evidence”, 
inquirer X’s state of full belief constitutes X’s state of evidence.  In that sense, credal probability is 
a function of evidence.   
For the most part, authors who thought this way maintained that credal states are 
representable by real valued conditional probability functions.  Thus, for Carnap (1962a, 1962b), 
the appropriate rule is represented by a confirmation function or, more accurately a credibility 
function.  We may recast Carnap’s approach so that it can be seen as a special case of the 
approach I favor.  If K is X’s current state of full belief, the degree of confirmation or credibility in 
Carnap’s sense accorded a hypothesis h by K should recommend a real valued credal probability 
function to be X’s credal state at that time.2  Authors like J.M.Keynes (1921) and H.E. Kyburg 
(1961, 1974) dissented from the demand that the function C deliver a numerically determinate 
credal state.  But they did maintain that the credal state should be a function of the state of full 
belief or evidence. 
I contend that the confirmational commitment, like the state of full belief, should be 
revisable when there is good reason.  This is an important departure from the received view.3  
Moreover, the state of full belief can change independently of the confirmational commitment and 
vice versa.  But X’s credal state cannot coherently change without either the confirmational 
commitment or state of full belief changing.4
                                                                                                                                                 
of the basic partition ULK whose members are consistent with K.  The set Δ of relevant potential expansions of the current 
state of full belief K is a subalgebra of Ψ.  The remainder of the set Ψ is the set of potential contractions of K.  In this 
discussion we will be focusing on potential expansions of K that are relevant potential answers and, hence, on the set Δ.  
But credal probability is normally considered to range over all elements of Φ and confirmational commitments (to be 
explained later) are also understood to be functions from elements of Φ to states of credal probability judgment.   When Φ 
is finite, the potential states may be represented by sets of sentences in a first order language closed under logical 
consequence.  Representation in the infinite case calls for technical qualifications of secondary interest here.  For more on 
the formal apparatus I deploy see Levi, 2004 ch.1 appendix and chapter 2.1-2.3.  See also Levi, 1991. 
 
2 Carnap (1962b and 1971) distinguished between confirmation functions that are characterized in purely logical and 
mathematical terms and credibility functions that are rules adopted by agents for determining what degrees of credence 
(credal probability) ought to be relative to different bodies of evidence.  My notion of a confirmational commitment is closer 
to the second idea than to the notion of a mathematical function.  In his (1952 and 1962a), this contrast is not made. 
 
3 The second part of Carnap’s (1952) does recognize the revisability of confirmation functions or inductive methods and 
considers how to rationalize such changes.  But this does not seem to be Carnap’s position elsewhere. 
 
4R.C. Jeffrey (1965) seems to allow changes in credal state without changes in state of full belief and without even 
recognizing confirmational commitments.  Either these changes reflect changes in state of full belief in a larger algebra of 
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A confirmational commitment ought to satisfy the following constraints (Levi, 1974, 1980): 
 Confirmational Consistency: 
(a) If K = K⊥, C(K) = ∅. 
(b) If K ≠ ∅, C(K) is a nonempty subset of Π 
Confirmational Coherence:  
C(K) is a set B of finitely additive and normalized conditional probability measures relative 
to K.  Every member of B is a permissible conditional credal probability function 
according to B relative to K 
Definition: 
Let Γ be the set of seriously possible accessible doxastic propositions relative to K.  
Q(x/y) is a finitely additive and normalized conditional probability relative to K if and only if 
x and y are accessible doxastic propositions in Φ, y is also in Γ and the following 
conditions are satisfied. 
(1) Q(x/y) ≥ 0. 
(2) If K+x = K+x’ and K+y = K+y’, Q(x/y) = Q(x’/y’). 
(3) If K+x has the complement of x∧x’ as a consequence, Q(x∨x’/y) = Q(x/y) + 
Q(x’/y). (finite additivity) 
(4) If K+y has x as a consequence, Q(x/y) = 1 .(normalization) 
(5) Q(x∧x’/y) = Q(x/x’∧y)Q(x’/y). (multiplication axiom) 
Confirmational Convexity: 
BBx is the set of permissible conditional probability functions according to C(K) = B relative 
to K when each function is restricted by holding specifying a particular y in Q(x/y) to form 
Qy(x).  If Qy(x) and Q’y(x) are in ByB
                                                                                                                                                
, so is every function of the form αQ(x) + (1-α)Q’(x). 
Confirmational Conditionalization: 
If C(K+y) = B* is consistent, then it is the conditionalization of C(K) = B.  That is to say 
every permissible function Qy(x/z) = Q(x/z∧y) in B is identical with some Q(x/z) in B* and 
every permissible Q(x/z) in B* is identical with some permissible Qy(x/z) in B. 
Confirmational conditionalization, like all the other constraints cited above, are conditions 
imposed on the confirmational commitment endorsed by an inquirer at a given time or in a given 
context.  By itself it implies nothing about how credal states ought to be changed over time.   
Given confirmational conditionalization, it is possible to characterize a confirmational 
commitment by first specifying the credal state relative to KT.  Every other consistent state K of 
 
doxastic propositions or changes in confirmational commitment without change in  full belief, changes in both or changes 
that the inquiring agent cannot rationalize.  In the latter case, each credal state may be coherent and rational but the 
agent cannot justify the change from one to the other either prospectively or retrospectively.  The suggestion that the 
agent may still be responsive to external inputs can be checked by some other agent but cannot be ascertained by the 
agent when reflecting on his or her  changes in view especially if this must be done without any change in state of full 
belief. 
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full belief is an expansion of KT.  Confirmational conditionalization then implies that C(K) is the 
conditionalization of C(KT).5
According to authors like Keynes, Jeffreys and Carnap, there should be a standard 
confirmational commitment to which all rational agents ought to be committed.  This standard was 
hopefully to be secured by principles of a probability logic.6  On this view, counter to the position I 
have taken, confirmational commitments are immune to modification.  The probability logic would 
define a logical probability or confirmational commitment. 
But according to the proposal made here, a logical confirmational commitment LC should 
be the largest set of conditional probability functions that probability logic allows being the set of 
permissible probabilities relative to KT.  This logical probability fails to rule out as impermissible 
any conditional credal probability relative to KT that satisfies the constraints of probability logic.  
But unless probability logic rules out all but one probability function as a member of C(KT) there 
are alternative confirmational commitments that are subsets of LC(KT) and, hence, stronger than 
LC.  In that case, probability logic alone cannot secure a standard confirmational commitment. 
Probability logic, so I shall assume, includes the constraints I have thus far imposed.  But 
there might be additional ones.  If they could be plausibly restrictive enough, one might take 
LC(KT) to be a singleton.  Confirmational Uniqueness would be secured as a consequence of 
probability logic and with it the identification of the logical probability LC as the standard 
confirmational commitment. 
But even the most ardent enthusiasts for logical probability seem to have conceded that 
no acceptable probability logic implies confirmational uniqueness.  Nonetheless, many authors 
                                                 
5 In Levi, 1980a, ch.16, I argue that H.E. Kyburg, R.A. Fisher and A.P.Dempster are committed to rejecting confirmational 
conditionalization and, hence, would not accept this alternative characterization of confirmational commitments.  In this 
discussion, I restrict attention to those who agree that confirmational commitments ought to be Bayesian – i.e, endorse 
confirmational conditionalization.  In Levi (1974), I characterized confirmational commitments the second way indicated 
here so that confirmational conditionalization was presupposed.  In 1980a, I adopted the first method so that Kyburg, et al. 
could be represented as exploiting confirmational commitments even though they did not endorse confirmational 
conditionalization. 
 
6Carnap called the logic an “inductive logic” and the probability a “logical” or “inductive” probability. 
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have endorsed probability logics that impose no further constraints on confirmational 
commitments than those I have listed - except for one.7
Confirmational Uniqueness. 
C(K) = B is a singleton. 
Notice that it is one thing to construct a probability logic that entails confirmational 
uniqueness because it entails a specific singleton for C(KT) which then is identical with LC(KT).  It 
is quite another to abandon that project and yet insist on confirmational uniqueness.  In the latter 
case, there is no confirmational commitment that qualifies as the logical confirmational 
commitment.  De Finetti (1972), Savage (1954) and other personalist or subjectivist Bayesians 
seem committed to some such view as this. 
On this subjectivist view, what becomes of the notion of a standard confirmational 
commitment?  There cannot be, of course, a single standard confirmational commitment secured 
by probability logic.  The personalists have tended, however, to think that each rational agent 
adopts his or her own permanent confirmational commitment.  As the later and more personalist 
inclined Carnap suggested, each inquirer adopts his or her own “credibility function” that once 
adopted is retained without modification (save perhaps in the case of some conceptual or 
arational upheaval). 
Once this view is in place, changes in credal state are uniquely determined by changes in 
state of full belief as it would be for necessitarians who insist on adopting LC (on the assumption 
that it exists) as the standard.  And changes in credal state due to expansion of the state of full 
belief can be characterized by what I have called Temporal Credal Conditionalization (Levi, 1974, 
1980) that is often called “conditionalization” or “Bayesian updating”..  Changes in credal state 
due to contraction are characterized by Inverse Temporal Credal Conditionalization. 
Many subjectivists seem to endorse Confirmational Tenacity according to which inquirer 
X should keep X’s confirmational commitment fixed even though probability logic does not 
mandate that everyone adopt X’s confirmational commitment and even though Y adopts a 
                                                 
7 T.Seidenfeld, among others have raised questions, about confirmational convexity.  I endorse 
confirmational convexity for reasons that cannot be elaborated here without taking us too far a field. 
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different confirmational commitment that is also rationally coherent.  X and Y are obliged to keep 
the faith with their respective confirmational commitments under all circumstances. 
An alternative form of subjectivism is discomfited by this.  R.C. Jeffrey (1965) proposed a 
point of view that can be represented as recommending that an inquirer X should change X’s 
confirmational commitment in response to sensory stimulation in a manner that can be 
represented by conformity to a certain  “rigidity condition” that yields a change in credal state 
often called “Jeffrey Conditionalization”.  Since Jeffrey thought that inquirers should never change 
states of full belief, there was no reason to deploy confirmational commitments.  On his view, 
there is a fixed state of full belief and credal states in constant flux.  Jeffrey’s view so understood 
abandons the idea that X’s commitment to a credal state at a given time is a function of X’s state 
of full belief or evidence.8
Yet, an account of inquiry aimed at justifying the modification of states of full belief should 
be accompanied with an account of efforts to justify changes in confirmational commitment.  Just 
as X stands in no need to justify X’s current full beliefs unless X has good reasons to call them 
into doubt, X does not need to justify continuing to deploy the same confirmational commitment 
unless it is called into doubt.  Confirmational tenacity is untenable.  But confirmational inertia 
seems to make good sense. 
An account of when confirmational commitments are justifiably changed is equivalent to 
an account of when an inquirer is justified in changing the “prior” probabilities used in Bayesian 
updating.  Like Jeffrey’s view, such an account would allow for violations of temporal credal 
conditionalization without abandoning the synchronic condition of confirmational 
conditionalization.  Unlike Jeffrey’s view, the one I favor makes essential use of the 
presupposition that the concern of the inquirer is to provide a basis for inductive expansion.  And 
it provides for indeterminacy in credal probability judgment in contravention of confirmational 
                                                 
8 As the total knowledge or total evidence requirement demands.  Jeffrey would deny that his view is insensitive to 
evidence understood as that stream of sensory inputs impinging on the agent.  Since, however, the agent cannot 
recognize the inputs, the agent cannot engage in critical control of these inputs to secure conformity to any regimen of 
belief change.  We can imagine an agent or robot who conformed to Jeffrey’s requirements in virtue of training or design.  
It is difficult to understand how a reflective inquirer X could exploit Jeffrey’s recommendations to identify the changes in 
credal state X should institute unless X changed X’s state of full belief as well. 
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uniqueness.  I shall return to the topic of revising confirmational commitments briefly at the end of 
the paper. 
3. Inductive Expansion 
Both in science and everyday life, there is interest in identifying both the best supported 
of rival answers to a given question and the answer all of whose consequences are supported to 
a sufficiently high a degree.  The question arises: How are notions of evidential support in the 
maximizing and in the satisficing sense related to each other and to the notion of evidential 
support in the expectation-determining sense associated with credal probability? 
The inquirer X answers the question under investigation by expanding X’s initial state of 
full belief.  When X uses the evidence available to X (i.e., the initial state of full belief K) to justify 
adopting a given answer, X deliberately expands the initial state K.  I claim that probability as well 
as maximizing and satisficing evidential support are relevant to justifying ampliative or inductive 
expansions of states of full belief or states of absolute certainty.  They are relevant, however, in 
distinct ways. 
There are several ways of legitimately and non degenerately expanding a state of full 
belief – that is to say of adding information to a state of full belief that is not already entailed by it.  
Here are two. 
Routine expansion using a program for responding to sensory input or to the testimony of 
others by adding propositions to one’s full beliefs is legitimate when the agent X is certain in 
advance that the program is sufficiently reliable.9  In routine expansion, X makes no decision 
concerning which of rival hypotheses to add to X’s state of full belief or absolute certainty.  The 
only decision X might make (if X makes any10) is to follow a program for belief acquisition.   
                                                 
9 Assessments of the reliability of programs for routine expansion are not assessments of evidential support.  The latter 
evaluate how well hypotheses held in suspense are supported by the information in X’s current state of full belief.  
Assessments of reliability are not assessments of how well conjectures are supported by the evidence but rather 
determinations of what the chances are of avoiding error in using a program for routine expansion.  Such determinations 
are implications of X’s state of full belief concerning the objective chances of certain processes. 
 
10 In many and, perhaps, most contexts, the inquirer already takes for granted that a program for routine expansion is 
reliable.  Perhaps, the inquirer acquired the conviction either explicitly or tacitly by nature or nurture.  A program is chosen 
only in contexts where the inquirer is in doubt as to which program among a roster of alternatives to use and comes to the 
conclusion that one is to be implemented over alternatives. 
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Ampliative or inductive expansion, as found in theory choice, estimation of a parameter, 
judgment as to the presence of a correlation, curve fitting and the like, is also a form of belief 
acquisition.   
In such cases, the inquirer has identified a set Δ of doxastic propositions as potential 
answers responsive to the question under investigation.  The members of Δ represent cognitive 
options from which the inquirer is to choose in a way that should promote the goals of his or her 
inquiry. 
Δ may be characterized as the set of Boolean combinations of an ultimate partition UK of 
doxastic propositions (potential states of full belief) such that K entails the truth of exactly one 
member of UK and each element of UK is consistent with K.11  In this discussion, attention will be 
restricted to finite ultimate partitions.  Every potential expansion of K relevant to the question 
under investigation may then be represented as follows: Identify a subset R of UK and its 
complement Rc in UK (the set theoretic complement in UK of R).  Let h be the join of the members 
of Rc.  The expansion K+h of K is the meet of K and h.  If R is empty and Rc = UK the expansion is 
K itself.  If R = UK and Rc is empty, the expansion is the inconsistent belief state K⊥.  Expansion 
by adding an element of UK is expansion by adding a maximally specific (with respect to the 
question under investigation) and consistent potential answer to K.  Other consistent potential 
answers involve some sort of partial suspension of judgment between members of UK.  
Expansion by adding an element of Δ to K is justified provided that it is shown to be the 
best or a best answer given the goals of the inquiry.  A best answer is one that carries maximum 
evidential support in the maximizing sense.  In inductive expansion, the inquirer seeks to adopt 
an answer that maximizes inductive expansion in this sense. 
In adopting an expansion by adding h to K, the inquirer commits him or her self to judging 
true not only the truth of the new state of full belief but also all other potential states of full belief 
or doxastic propositions that are consequences in Δ (and indeed of Φ) of that state of full belief.  
                                                 
11 So Δ is a subalgebra of the algebra of accessible potential states Φ. 
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Changes in states of full belief are represented as changes in such states represented 
collectively. 
Now instead of representing the inductive expansion as the best supported of the 
available potential expansions in the maximizing sense, one might represent it as the expansion 
all of whose consequences are supported in the satisficing sense to a degree at or above a given 
threshold.  Whereas support in the maximizing sense applies to the expansion represented 
collectively, support in the satisficing sense applies to the expansion taken distributively. 
The first question that arises is whether there are maximizing and satisficing measures 
that recommend the same set of doxastic propositions as the inductive expansion of K.   
4. Probability as evidential support. 
The answer is clearly “Yes!”  One way to do this is to take probability to be both the 
maximizing and satisficing index of evidential support.  Regardless of the probability distribution 
over UK relative to K, choosing the potential expansion maximizing probability is choosing the 
weakest potential expansion – to wit, refusing to reject any elements of UK.  R is empty and Rc = 
UK.  Moreover, if the threshold for adding a doxastic proposition is set at probability 1, the 
threshold for rejecting an element of UK is 0 so that once more R is empty.  Probability can, 
indeed, be a maximizing and a satisficing measure of degree of belief provided one refuses to 
recognize the legitimacy of any genuinely ampliative expansion.12
These considerations demonstrate that anyone who thinks of probability as a maximizing 
index of evidential support or degree of belief is an anti inductivist.  And anti inductivists can have 
no use for measures of evidential support for the purpose of evaluating expansion strategies 
relative to an initial state of full belief in order to decide how to change that state of full belief.  To 
construe degrees of belief in the maximizing sense as degrees of probability is to reduce the 
conception of degree of belief in the maximizing sense to uselessness.  Assessing hypotheses 
relative to K with respect to probability is highly relevant to the evaluation of options in a decision 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking the maximum probability here should be probability in the sense of “absolute certainty” where there is 
no serious possibility that the proposition bearing probability 1 is false.  If h is “almost certain” so that it might be false 
even though it carries probability 1, the probability is not a maximum.  The threshold for satisficing should be understood 
as absolute certainty as well.  I ignore these niceties in the text. 
 10
problem with respect to expected value.  But the expectation determining function of credal 
probability is distinct from its alleged function as an assessment of evidential support.  A way of 
assessing hypotheses with respect to how well they are supported by K is relevant in a context 
where the inquirer is still in suspense as to which member of UK is true and is seeking to decide 
on the basis of his or her evidence K which members to rule out and which to continue to 
recognize as possibly true.  That is to say, the inquirer is deliberating concerning how to expand 
inductively.  Anti inductivists do not engage in such activity. 
Perhaps probability is a satisficing index of evidential support that licenses inductive 
expansions distributively by recommending the addition to the state of full belief K of all joins of 
subsets of UK with probability greater than some threshold less than 1.  If UK contains n elements, 
the threshold must be greater than (n-1)/n in order to avoid the addition of a set of doxastic 
propositions a set at least one of whose members must be false.  And, with the threshold at that 
level, the set of doxastic propositions added to K will not, in general, be a set closed under the 
consequence relation.  Hence, it will not be the set of consequences of the meet of K with a 
doxastic proposition.  It will not be an inductive expansion.  Using probability as a satisficing index 
of evidential support is also an anti inductivist view.  Using probability in this way is as subversive 
of its own applicability as is using probability as evidential support in the satisficing sense. 
As noted previously, there were and continue to be many authors attracted to a high 
probability criterion of “acceptance” or “belief” in some sense or other who are unabashed anti 
inductivists.  They suggest that the “qualitative” notion of belief is a convenient summary of 
information conveyed by an index of evidential support where the latter is degree of credal 
probability.  Instead of saying that “X believes that h” one might say “X judges it highly probable 
that h.”  On this view, degree of belief does not have to be closed under consequence since it is 
not a satisficing measure useful for inductive expansion. 
Whatever the merits of this proposal might be, it does not capture the idea that X may be 
said to believe that h truly or erroneously.  When X judges it probable that h, X’s judgment is 
neither true nor false.  If belief that h is the judgment that the probability that h, we cannot say that 
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X’s belief that h is true or that it is false.  It is a mere doxastic epiphenomenon.  It would be best 
to do without it. 
I do not mean to suggest that full belief is the only qualitative notion of belief of 
importance.  X may be said to believe that h if and only if X believes that h to a positive degree (in 
the satisficing sense).  In another sense, X believes that h if and only if X believes that h to 
sufficiently high degree in a satisficing sense to warrant coming to full belief that h.  In this second 
sense, the high degree of belief relative to K is regarded as sufficiently high to justify changing 
one’s mind and coming to full belief that h.  So belief that h in the sense in which it is a codeword 
for sufficiently high degree of belief relative to K is significant because it warrants a change in 
state of full belief by inductive expansion.  Recognizing such warrants is a hallmark of 
inductivism.  Anti inductivists who do not acknowledge genuinely ampliative inductive expansion 
have tended to engage in a kind of conceptual bad music of the sort that the arch anti inductivist, 
Rudolf Carnap, charged Heidegger with composing.  They seek to exploit the ideas of inductivism 
while denying its legitimacy.  To do so, they engage in conceptual manipulation that is profoundly 
confusing. 
5. Evidential support in the maximizing sense. 
In choosing among answers to a question, we are often advised to choose the one that is best 
supported by the evidence.  If the choice of a potential answer is a decision problem, the best 
answer is the one that optimally promotes the goals of the inquiry.  The goals of inquiry may be 
as diverse as the inquiries themselves.  But they may share certain features in common.  I 
assume that the goals ought to share in common that they are multidimensional.  On the one 
hand, an inquirer ought to seek to avoid error in inductive expansion.  On the other hand, an 
inquirer ought to seek to obtain information of value relevant to answer the question under 
investigation. 
If an inquirer were concerned solely to avoid error, a best answer to the question under 
investigation would be one that minimizes probability that the inductive expansion will import false 
belief – i.e., that maximizes the probability that the inductive expansion is true.  In that case, 
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probability would be evidential support in the maximizing sense.  If the considerations adduced 
against doing so are well taken, then we also have a good reason to reject the view that avoiding 
error is the sole aim common to all properly chosen inductive expansions. 
To avoid the result, account should be taken of other risk-of-error inducing desiderata 
that should be balanced with avoidance of error.  In extremely idealized circumstances, the trade 
off can be represented as a utility function for the possible outcomes of expanding K according to 
one of the “cognitive options”.  Each of these options can be evaluated with respect to expected 
utility.  The inquirer ought then to restrict his choice of an expansion strategy to one that 
maximizes expected utility. 
In this way, the measure of expected (epistemic) utility is the measure of evidential 
support in the maximizing sense. 
5. Information and Informational Value 
Before characterizing expected epistemic utility further, attention should be paid to the 
desideratum other than avoidance of error that provides a legitimate incentive to risk error.  We 
may look at the desideratum in one of two ways:  
1. The desideratum may be recommended as the sole desideratum that ought to be 
pursued in making the choice.  Explanatory value, simplicity, easiness and many 
other such notions have been touted as such desiderata.   
2. The desideratum may be urged to be one of two desiderata – the other being 
avoidance of error – that should be balanced against one another.  This is the 
view I shall eventually defend. 
Advocates of these views are not always clear as to the scope of their recommendation.  
Is the evaluation with respect to one of these desiderata to apply exclusively to the elements of 
UK or should it be extended to the entire algebra Δ of potential answers?   
If the former reading is correct, then no answer is given to the question of how to decide 
when two or more elements of UK are optimal with respect to the recommended desideratum. 
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One cannot recommend suspension of judgment as a tiebreaker in such cases because there is 
no basis for suggesting that suspension of judgment between all optimal elements of UK is 
optimal.  In order for tie breaking in this fashion to be rationally admissible, surely this condition 
ought to be met.   
According to view (2), all elements of the algebra Δ generated by UK are capable of being 
evaluated with respect to avoidance of error.  If there is to be a trade off between avoidance or 
error and the new desideratum, the evaluation with respect to the second desideratum should be 
extended to elements of Δ as well. 
Potential answers that are more specific, rule out more elements of UK, relieve doubt 
more or carry more information relative to K partially orders the elements of Δ with respect to the 
information carried or with respect to the strength or specificity of the answer.  h is stronger than g 
given K if and only if g is a consequence of K∧h but h is not a consequence of K∧g. 
According to this partial ordering, the elements of UK are non comparable.  But the 
elements of UK may be completely ordered with respect to simplicity, explanatory power or the 
like.  Although joins of subsets of UK are sometimes compared in such an ordering, there is by no 
means complete unanimity as to whether weaker hypotheses are more or less explanatory than 
the alternatives that entail them or whether suspending judgment between two or more elements 
of UK is simpler or more complex than the alternatives themselves.   
We do not need to settle such questions.  We are looking for a weak ordering of the 
elements of Δ or, even better a real valued utility function that is faithful to that ordering.  To 
achieve this, the evaluation of the elements of UK is used to develop a measure Cont(x) = 1 – 
M(x) defined over the elements of UK.  This function represents the assessment of simplicity, 
explanatory power or whatever is taken to be the concern of the inquirer.  This assessment is 
extended to the entire domain Δ by taking M to be a probability measure.  The extension respects 
the evaluation of the elements of Δ as carrying more or less information.  But the appeal to the 
evaluation of the elements of UK with respect to the interest in simplicity, explanatory power or 
whatever yields an integrated single weak ordering or, indeed, into a single quantitative measure.  
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I call the resulting weak ordering of or measure for Δ an assessment of informational value.13  My 
preferred way of doing this (see footnote 3) is to represent the weak ordering by a measure of 
undamped informational value Cont(h) = 1-M(h) where M is an unconditional probability over Δ. 
In contrast to the views of Popper, Carnap and Bar Hillel, the probability M that defines 
the measure Cont representing undamped informational value is not in general the same 
probability measure representing the inquirer’s credal probability judgments used in determining 
expected values. (Levi, “Information and Inference”, 1967).  The credal probability Q is 
expectation-determining and in this sense characterizes degrees of belief.  The M-function does 
not represent degrees of belief.  It is informational-value determining. 
On the account I have just given, no commitment has been made as to what aspects of 
the strongest K-consistent potential answers in UK are evaluated by the Cont-function.  It could be 
explanatory power in some sense or other, simplicity in some sense or other, congeniality with 
some theological, ideological or political agenda.  An inquirer may be conflicted between several 
different desiderata of this kind.  If the inquirer is able to do so to his or her satisfaction, the 
conflict may be resolved by adopting a utility function that is a weighted average of the competing 
desiderata.  If no such resolution is endorsed, the inquirer should remain in doubt as to which 
potential resolution (as represented by a weighted average) to adopt.  Hence, his assessments of 
the informational value of elements of UK will be represented by a set of Cont-functions.  [I require 
that the set be convex but I shall not elaborate on this point here.]  Each such permissible Cont-
function can be extended to a function over Δ in the manner indicated before. 
Let us now return to the consideration of thesis (1).  According to (1), informational value 
is the sole desideratum.  This leads to the dubious recommendation that inquirers contradict 
                                                 
3 A few assumptions are needed to make this work.  Weak Positive Monotonicity states that rejecting an element of the 
ultimate partition never decreases the informational value of a potential answer. Constant Marginal Increment in 
Informational Value of Rejection states that the increment in informational value afforded by rejecting element x of UK is 
the same regardless of which and how many other elements of UK are rejected.   if h is more informative than g, h carries 
at least as much informational value as g.  If we assume that any numerical evaluation of informational value is 
normalizable so that it can be restricted to values between 0 and 1, a representation of informational value is unique up to 
a positive affine transformation of Cont(h) = 1 –M(h) where M is an unconditional probability defined for elements of Δ.  
See “Information and Inference” from 1967 reissued in Levi (1983) ch.5 and Levi, (2004 3.2). 
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themselves for, in that way, informational value will be maximized regardless of what Cont-
functions or M-functions are permissible.   
I conjecture that those advocates of “inference to the best explanation” and cognate 
views mean to disregard expansion into inconsistency for some reason or other.  Doing so lands 
them in more hot water.  They must then choose an element of UK.  There can be no room for 
suspense between two or more elements of UK carrying maximum informational value 
(explanatory value or what have you).  The damped informational value must be less than the 
damped informational values carried by the elements of UK.  So for this view to work, there must 
be a unique element of UK carrying maximum informational value. 
Fans of so called “inference to the best explanation” often bolster their view by shifting in 
the direction of thesis (2).  Simplicity (or explanatory power or whatever) is taken to be sigillum 
vera.  On the assumption that the simplicity ordering ranks elements of UK, this view implies that 
for x and y that are elements of UK, Q(x) ≥ Q(y) if and only if Cont(x) ≥ Cont(y) if and only if M(y) ≥ 
M(x).  Thus, maximizing informational value among the elements of UK is maximizing probability 
among them so that someone seeking a simple hypothesis could also be concerned with 
acquiring true beliefs (avoiding error).  This is not quite what thesis (2) asserts as we shall see but 
it is a gesture in that direction that is often taken as enough to secure fealty to the idea that we 
seek to avoid error in fixing belief. 
It is but a gesture and not a very convincing one.   
For starters, why should anyone think that the ranking of UK with respect to simplicity or 
whatever agrees with the ranking of UK with respect to probability of truth?   
If probability is taken to be statistical probability or chance, the truth or falsity of the claim 
depends upon nature acquiescing to our assessments of simplicity being correlated with 
probability.  I suppose there may be cases where this is true but they will be matched by cases 
where the claim is false.   
If probability is taken to be personal or credal probability, urging individuals to conform to 
its dictates seems more akin to fatuous optimism than to reason and, indeed, to a priori reason as 
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some have asserted.  Charles Peirce pointed out that Mill’s Uniformity of Nature principle is false.  
Nature is uniform in some respects but not in others.  To think of simplicity as the mark of truth or 
likelihood of truth is no better. 
In any case, the question arises: what should one do when two or more elements of UK 
are both simplest elements of UK?  Suspending judgment between them minimizes risk of error.  
But it incurs a loss in informational value.  An answer grounded on a conception of the aims of 
inquiry is called for.  None is given. 
I conclude that the risk inducing desideratum, whatever it is, should not be the sole 
desideratum being promoted in inductive expansion.  I also suggest that postulating principles of 
reason proclaiming that hypotheses that are attractive according to the desideratum are more 
likely to be true are, as a general rule, unacceptable. 
6.Seeking new, error free and valuable information. 
Given K and UK, the cognitive options are the several expansion strategies.  Throughout 
this discussion, UK will be assumed to be finite.  Infinite cases are discussed in Levi, 2004.   
On the assumption that the goal to be attained is to add new information that is (1) error 
free and (2) is of value, the expansion strategy that recommends suspending judgment between 
the elements of Rc or equivalently rejecting the elements of R where R is a subset of UK has a 
payoff <T(Rc,t), Cont(Rc)> if the true element of UK is in Rc and <T(Rc,f), Cont(Rc)> if the true 
element of UK is in R.  T(Rc,x) = 1 (0) when x = t (f).  The utility of this payoff is αT(Rc) + (1-
α)Cont(Rc) where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.14
If we also assume that no payoff for any option that imports error is assigned greater 
utility by the aggregate or compromise utility than the payoff for any option that avoids error, α 
cannot be less than 0.5.  The compromise utility function can be converted into any positive 
                                                 
14 That a potential compromise between two conflicting desiderata representable as von Neumann Morgenstern utilities 
over the mixture set of the set of available options ought itself to be a von Neumann Morgenstern utility together with the 
requirement that all shared (paretian) agreements between the  two desiderata should preserved in the potential 
compromise argues for this weighted average condition. 
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transformation without altering any conclusions to be recommended.  The following is a useful 
transformation.  T(Rc,x) – qM(Rc) where q = (1-α)/α ranges from 0 to 1. 
The expected epistemic utility of rejecting the elements of R (i.e., expanding K by adding 
all the consequences of K∧Rc) is then  
Q(Rc) – qM(Rc) = EV(Rc) 
According to the idea posed previously, EV(Rc) should be the evidential support in the 
maximizing sense for the potential answer Rc provided by K given the demands for information 
imposed by UK and Cont, the assessment of risk of error provided by Q, and the degree of 
boldness exercised by the inquirer in reaching a balance between avoiding error and acquiring 
new information of value. 
When is EV(Rc) a maximum?  EV(Rc) = ∑x∈Rc[Q(x) – qM(x)].  For finite UK, the maximum 
will be reached when every x in Rc is such that Q(x) – qM(x) is non negative and all x in UK such 
that Q(x) – qM(x) that are positive are in Rc.  If there elements of UK such that Q(x) – qM(x) = 0, 
several sets Rc can carry maximum EV value.  I have long advocated breaking ties for optimality 
by choosing the largest optimal set.  Q(x) – qM(x) ≥ 0 for all x in this Rc.   
Inductive Rejection Rule 
Element y in UK is rejected (is in R) if and only if Q(y) < qM(y). 
Inductive Expansion Rule 
Expand K by adding Rc obtained by the inductive rejection rule. 
Before inductive expansion, X’s belief state is K and X is committed to fully believing all 
consequences of K.   
After expansion, X’s belief state is K∧Rc and X is committed to believing all 
consequences of this expanded belief state. 
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7. Is the difference between a posterior and a prior probability a maximizing index of 
evidential support? 
It is clear that this measure of evidential support in the maximizing sense is not 
probability.  But it bears a formal resemblance to one of a family of measures that many 
Bayesians are prepared to endorse. 
To explain let us subscript the current credal probability with the state of full belief K that 
supports it so that the function is QK.  Let K* be a state of full belief such that K = K*∧E = K*+E – 
i.e., K is an expansion of K* by adding E (consistent with K*) and the consequences of doing so.  
Finally, let QK(H/F) = QK*(H/F∧E).  QK* is the prior probability and QK is the posterior probability.15
Many Bayesians have adopted QK(H) – QK*(H) as a measure of confirmation or evidential 
support.  When this difference is positive, E positively confirms or supports H (E is positively 
relevant to H).  Similar conditions obtain mutatis mutandis for 0 and negative differences.   
Formally the Bayesian formula and the EV-function are both differences between two 
distinct probability functions.  The EV-function modifies the difference by the insertion of a 
“boldness” parameter q; but many of the formal properties of the two functions are similar. 
However, not only are the intended interpretations different.  So are some of the formal 
properties.  In the EV-function, the second term is the informational value determining probability.  
It represents the assessment of informational value that takes into account the relative 
informational values of the elements of UK and their Boolean combinations.   
In the difference between the posterior and prior function, the prior function is defined 
over a larger domain of possibilities than the posterior function QK is.  The ultimate partition UK 
relative to K could be a subset of some partition UK* relative to K*.  Consequently there could be a 
pair of propositions H and H’ whose equivalence is not entailed by K* but is entailed by K.  Hence 
QK(H) – QK*(H) need not equal QK(H’) – QK*(H’) even though the expansion of K by H and the 
expansion of K by H’ are the same expansion.  Using the difference between the posterior and 
                                                 
15 There are many “prior” states of full belief K* and potential states E that could qualify for use in characterizing the prior 
probability QK*.  The difficulties raised here apply to all of them so that there is little need to investigate the merits of rival 
proposals as long as the conditions in the text are satisfied. 
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the prior assigns at least two distinct degrees of evidential support to the same inductive 
expansion in such cases.  In contexts where the concern is the evaluation of inductive expansion 
strategies from K, this ambiguity cannot be acceptable.  No such ambiguity plagues the EV-
function.16
To be sure, when an investigator X in state of full belief K* is designing an experiment 
that may yield by routine expansion one of a range of items of information or “data points” 
including E, X may want to know whether the outcome of the experiment will be probabilistically 
relevant to elements of an ultimate partition UK* that includes H.  The difference between a 
posterior and a prior is an index of the probabilistic relevance of E to H.   
But appraisals of potential data points with respect to probabilistic relevance are 
inappropriate as evaluations of the merits of potential inductive expansions aimed at answering a 
given question.  EV-functions are better assessments of evidential support in the maximizing 
sense. 
8.Satisficing Measures of Evidential Support. 
The index q = (1-α)/α in the measure of inductive support in the maximizing sense takes 
values from 0 to 1 due to the restriction of α to values in the interval [0.5,1].  As q increases, the 
weight attached to Cont(h) as compared to T(h,x) increases.  When q = 0, Cont(h) is completely 
discounted.  The inquirer is focused exclusively on avoidance of error.  No element h of Δ 
consistent with K is rejected even if Q(h) = 0.17  When q = 0.5, the weight attached to Cont(h) is 
the maximum allowed.  For this reason, the index q may be called the index of boldness.18
Consider a state of full belief K, ultimate partition UK and algebra of potential answers Δ 
generated by UK, credal probability function and Cont function for Δ.  For every consistent h in Δ, 
there is a unique value q(h) (0 ≤ q(h) ≤ 1) for the index of boldness such that when EV is 
                                                 
16 This ambiguity is related to the multiplicity of factorizations of the difference between a posterior and and prior into an 
ampliative and explicative component that emerged after Popper and Miller (1983) sought to argue for the impossibility of 
inductive probability.  (Levi, 1984b. 
 
17 On the other hand, if h is inconsistent with K so that Q(h) = 0 and q = 0, the rule for Ties guarantees that h is rejected. 
 
18 I owe the use of this term to a suggestion made by R.C.Jeffrey.  In Levi, 1967a, I used the less felicitous term “degree 
of caution”.  q decreases with the increase in caution. 
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maximized with an index of boldness q ≤ q(h) and the Rule for Ties is deployed, h fails to be 
rejected and for all values of q > q(h) if there are any such values less than or equal to 1, h is 
rejected.  For h in Δ inconsistent with K, h is rejected for every value of q in the closed interval 
from 0 and 1, so there is no value of q(h) in the permitted range.  It is useful, however, to set q(h) 
= 0 even though, in contrast to the case where q(h) = 0 but h is consistent with K, h is rejected 
when q = 0 as well as when q > 0.  q(h) is the degree of unrejectability of h (relative to K, UK, Q 
and M). 
If x is an element of UK, the degree of unrejectability q(x) is easily seen to be equal to the 
minimum of Q(x)/M(x) and 1.  For values of q ≤ Q(x)/M(x) < 1, x fails to be rejected.  For greater 
values of q, it is rejected.  If Q(x)/M(x) ≥ 1, x fails to be rejected for every value of q between 0 
and 1 and q(x) = 1. 
If h in Δ is consistent with K, h is equivalent given K to a disjunction of elements of a 
subset ||h|| of UK.  It is rejected if and only if all elements of ||h|| are rejected.  Hence, q(h ) = 
maxx∈UK[q(x)].  Moreover, there must be at least one element x of UK for which q(x) = 1 and, 
hence, for any h, either q(h) = 1 or q(~h) = 1.  As before, in case h is inconsistent with K and ||h|| 
is therefore empty, we stipulate that q(h) = 0.  These are formal properties of possibility measures 
according to Dubois and Prade (1992). 
I have long contended that the degree of disbelief or potential surprise that h, d(h), 
increases with a decrease in its degree of unrejectability and may be conveniently represented by 
1 – q(h). (Levi, 1967a).  If the inquirer fixes a degree of boldness q for purposes of inductive 
expansion, an element of the ultimate partition is rejected if and only if d(x) = 1-q(x) = 1 – 
Q(x)/M(x) is above the threshold 1 – q.  All elements in ||h|| are rejected just in case the one with 
the smallest d-value is.  Hence, d(h) = minx∈||h||[d(x)] and h will be rejected just in case this 
minimum is above 1-q. 
Let b(h) = d(~h). 
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Once the degree of boldness is specified, a threshold 1-q is determined such that h is a 
consequence of the recommended expansion of K if and only if b(h) ≥ 1-q.  It is demonstrable that 
the set of potential states in Δ that meet this requirement constitute the consequences in Δ of the 
recommended expansion of K. The b-function qualifies as a degree of belief function or evidential 
support function in the satisficing sense.  Fixing the value of the boldness parameter q to be used 
to determine the recommended expansion is equivalent to specifying the threshold degree of 
belief such that all and only elements of Δ carrying degree of belief higher than that threshold are 
consequences of the recommended expansion. 
Prior to inductive expansion relative to K, UK, Q and M, the b-function (or the d-function, 
or the q-function) may be used to appraise the status of elements of Δ as candidates for 
admission into the expanded state of full belief.  Once the degree of boldness is fixed and a 
decision is taken, the inquirer is committed to becoming absolutely certain of the truth of the 
propositions initially assigned degrees of belief short of the maximum.19
If the inquirer is not allowed to engage in inductive expansion as a matter of principle, the 
appraisals in terms of d-functions, b-functions and q-functions would serve no useful purpose.  
Indeed, this is true of any candidate measure of degree of belief in the satisficing sense. 
Many authors are interested in characterizing a “qualitative” notion of belief that is not 
equivalent to full belief.  Wolfgang Spohn, for example, introduces a notion of plain belief as belief 
to a positive degree. (Spohn, 1990, 149, 150-1.)  Such a notion makes eminently good sense 
according to the account I favor.  Plain beliefs are elements of Δ that would be added to K were 
the inquirer maximally bold – i.e., were the inquirer to adopt q = 1.  Elements of Δ that cannot be 
added to K even when q = 1 cannot be added to K under any circumstances as long as K, UK, Q 
and M are held fixed. 
                                                 
19 For this reason, the inquirer can iterate the operation of inductive expansion on the truncation of UK resulting from 
rejecting elements of this partition with boldness q.  The credal probability and M-functions can be updated and rejections 
using the same level of boldness q applied once more.  The process can be iterated until no further rejections are 
achieved.  As long as the ultimate partition initially used is finite, a fixed point will be achieved.  We may look on the entire 
process as a single inductive expansion according to a stable inductive expansion rule with boldness q.  New functions 
q(h), d(h) and b(h) can be defined for such a stable inductive expansion rule.  (Levi, 1967a  , 1980a, 1996, 2004.)  Stable 
inductive expansions form the basis for the account of inductive expansion I offer for cases where the ultimate partition is 
infinite. 
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The set of plain beliefs PB1 relative to K constitutes an expansion of K.  This expansion is 
closed under consequence as is every coherent expansion of K.  The set of plain beliefs is either 
error free (true) or false.  However, from the point of view of the inquirer prior to expansion, the 
expansion is not judged error free or erroneous.  So the inquirer cannot claim to have judged truth 
rightly or wrongly in terms of his or her beliefs.  No risk of error is incurred.  No erstwhile serious 
possibilities have been eliminated.  Nor have the credal probability judgments over elements of Δ 
been altered.  Nonetheless, there is an important relation between plain belief and full belief.  If X 
plainly believes that h when X’s state of full belief is K without fully believing that h and exercises 
maximum boldness to change X’s state of full belief K by inductive expansion, X should add 
expand K so that h becomes one of the consequences. 
We can consider sets of sentences PBq consisting of all doxastic propositions that carry 
degree of belief greater than 1 – q for any value of q from 0 to 1.  These too will characterize a 
conception of qualitative belief where the set of beliefs is closed under consequence.  These are 
the sentences that would be added if the degree of boldness q were exercised.  When the state 
of full belief is K, they are not fully believed but only believed to a degree greater than 1 – q. 
There are thus many conceptions of qualitative belief that differ from full belief.  The full 
beliefs in K are the elements of PB0 – i.e., the elements of Δ consistent with K that fail to be 
rejected when q = 0.  These are, of course, the elements of Δ consistent with K. 
Thus, the elements of Δ consistent with K are ranked with respect to how bold the 
inquirer needs to be (given K, UK, Q and M) in order to believe them in some qualitative sense.  
But the ranking has no significant application except in the context of evaluating inductive 
expansions aimed at changing states of full belief.  If inductive expansion is never legitimate, as 
many authors seem to think, the ranking itself is useless. 
L.J. Cohen (1977) has contended that degree of belief measures similar to the one I have 
just proposed is a measure of Baconian probability in contrast to the Pascalian probability 
structured according to finitely and possibly countably additive measures of mathematical 
probability.  I think Cohen is right to maintain that d-functions have as much legitimate claim (but 
 23
no more) to represent a presystematic conception of belief probability as Q-functions do.  But it is 
not worthwhile to engage in fruitless disputes over this matter.  Inductivists like Cohen and myself 
can recognize that both types of indices have important uses.  We need to take note of these 
measures and their uses and to respect their differences.  In particular, we should stop confusing 
degree of belief in the satisficing sense with expectation determining credal probability.  Once we 
do that, we may avoid the temptation to indulge in tedious and pointless discussions of lottery and 
preface paradoxes.   
9. Indeterminacy in Credal Probability and Changing Confirmational Commitments 
When an inquirer is in a state of full belief, X is committed to being certain of the truth of 
some (doxastic) propositions and remaining in suspense (and, in that sense, in ignorance) of 
others.  No inquirer should claim to be opinionated in the sense of being certain as to which 
doxastic propositions are true and which are false in all cases.  Such a claim presupposes that 
there are maximally consistent potential states of full belief in some space of potential states 
accessible “in principle” to all rational agents.  The inquirer’s opinionated claim is a claim of 
certainty as to which is the true one.  This would be a manifest bit of arrogance if it were 
comprehensible.  But no matter how finely we discriminate between possibilities, we cannot rule 
out ever more subtle distinctions.  There are no possible worlds.  Maximal opinionation in the 
sense just considered is incoherent.  No matter how much we strive, occasions for inquiry 
prompted by doubt should remain. 
In the face of ignorance, many authors turn to probability for solace.  I submit, however, 
that opinionation concerning credal probability judgment can avoid the charge of absurd 
arrogance only if it, like full belief, is partial and modest. 
Those authors who acknowledge the intelligibility of objective chance have, of course, 
recognized that inquirers may be in doubt as to the truth of rival statistical hypotheses.  Statistical 
hypotheses are doxastic propositions and like other potential states of full belief carry truth-
values.  States of credal probability judgment, by way of contrast, lack truth-values.  One cannot 
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coherently suspend judgment with respect to the truth of a credal probability judgment or assign a 
credal probability as to the truth of such a judgment. 
Yet, it does make sense to withhold numerically determinate credal probability judgment.  
A distribution of credal probability over some algebra of doxastic propositions is not a truth-value 
bearing proposition, so one cannot suspend judgment as to its truth.  But a credal probability 
distribution has a use in evaluating expected values of options in decision problems.  In 
deliberating in the context of some decision problem, the deliberating agent may rule out some 
probability distributions as impermissible for use in evaluating expected values of options and fail 
to rule out others so that they remain permissible for use.  In this respect, X’s state of credal 
probability judgment at a given time may serve not as a standard for serious possibility but 
instead as a standard for serious permissibility. 
This is not the occasion to enter into a detailed account of the way such states of 
indeterminate credal probability judgment should be used to evaluate options; but something 
needs to be said so as not to leave the impression that the reference to a standard for serious 
permissibility is nothing more than a rhetorical flourish.20   
Given a set of available options and a specification of the payoffs for outcomes of each 
option in each state of nature in terms of a determinate utility function, a permissible expected 
utility function for the available options may be determined for each permissible credal probability 
distribution over the states of nature.  The set of optimal options with respect to expected utility 
can then be determined for that permissible expected utility function and, hence, for that 
permissible probability function.  This can be done for each permissible credal probability 
function.  The set of options that are admissible with respect to expected utility (E-admissible) is 
the set of options that come out optimal according to some seriously permissible probability 
distribution in the credal state. 
                                                 
20 For further elaboration, see Levi, 1980a and 1999. 
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Further elaboration leads to an account of E-admissibility when not only the agent’s 
credal probability state but state of utility judgment is numerically indeterminate.  Additional 
criteria can then be added to reduce the set of E-admissible options to smaller subsets.21
Our topic in this paper is degrees of belief or evidential support.  Strictly speaking, credal 
probability is a matter of degree only in very special cases where credal probability judgment is 
numerically determinate.  I do not mean therefore to question the thesis that credal probability 
judgment is a type of degree of belief.  Credal probability is what it is.  It functions as a means for 
evaluating options with respect to E-admissibility and, as a consequence, serves as a “guide in 
life”.  It provides finer grained discriminations between serious possibilities than the state of full 
belief K does but like full belief contributes to practical deliberation in making such 
discriminations.  There is no reason to refuse to recognize credal probability as degree of belief.  
We should avoid, however, granting it exclusive title to that epithet.  And we should recognize that 
degrees of belief so conceived may and often should go indeterminate. 
The significance of the indeterminacy has been often been obscured because of a 
tendency on the part of those who insist that rationality requires determinacy in probability 
judgment to acknowledge that inquiring agents are not capable of measuring either the credal 
probability judgments of others or their own with absolute precision. 
There is no disputing that this claim is true.  It is obviously true when X seeks to 
determine the credal probability judgments of Y but it is also true when X assesses the credal 
probability judgments of X.  Acknowledgment of the limitations on our capacities to be perfectly 
rational include not merely recognition of our lack of logical omnisicience and parallel limitations 
on our capacity to be probabilistically coherent but also limitations on our capacity for fulfilling our 
commitments to self knowledge.  We are incapable of fulfilling our commitments to fully believe 
the logical consequences of our full beliefs and to make credal probability judgments in 
conformity with the calculus of probability.  We are likewise incapable of fully believing that we 
believe that h when we do so and that we do not believe that h when we do not do so even 
                                                 
21 See Levi, 1980a, 1986, 1999 for further details. 
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though we are committed to both sorts of self-knowledge by ideal standards of rationality.  And 
parallel remarks apply to X’s about Y’s credal state and X’s credal state. 
Such ignorance gives rise to imprecision in judgments as to what X’s credal state is even 
if X’s credal state is numerically determinate.  Strict Bayesians are quite comfortable about 
acknowledging such imprecision.  They oppose indeterminacy in probability judgment.  
Recognizing indeterminacy is acknowledging a kind of ignorance that strict Bayesians refuse to 
countenance.  This is a kind of ignorance that recognizes that there can be E-admissibility without 
optimality.  In such cases, probabilistic ignorance generates ignorance as to what one ought to 
do. 
The sort of ignorance in probability judgment strict Bayesians can allow is lack of self-
knowledge and the attendant failure of commitment.  The cure for such failure is some process of 
clarification whereby one comes to recognize commitments one already has.  Those who 
acknowledge indeterminacy insist that there are forms of ignorance concerning probability 
judgment that are removed through inquiry rather than some process of therapeutic clarification.  
Whereas therapeutic clarification is a process of change of view where the current state is 
recognized to be rationally incoherent and the aim is to extricate oneself from that state, inquiry is 
undertaken to alter the rationally coherent point of view to which the inquirer is committed.  This 
involves justifying one commitment in favor of another.  Choosing an inductive expansion requires 
such justification of a change in commitment to full belief.  I would like now to consider some 
aspects of changing confirmational commitments and how they are to be justified. 
Suppose X faces a problem relative to K with ultimate partition UK and informational value 
determining probability M.  X’s confirmational commitment C is such that X’s credal state B over 
UK is highly indeterminate.  X may have come to this result because X and Y initially differed in 
their confirmational commitments and credal states even though they shared the same state of 
full belief.  In order for X to explore differences with Y, X should shift to a confirmational 
commitment that recommends a credal state that recognizes the credal probability functions 
recognized as permissible according X’s state and the credal probability functions recognized as 
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permissible according to Y’s all to be permissible.  That is to say, B may be convex hull of their 
two credal states.  Both X and Y are concerned to strengthen the credal state B prior to running 
some experiment obtaining data they mean to use in attempting to answer the question 
expressed by UK and M. 
One proposal for doing this is to recognize as permissible all credal distributions over UK 
that when combined with UK, M and the degree of boldness q adopted by the inquirers X and Y 
fail to reject any of the elements of UK.  The strengthened credal state would avoid bias in one 
way or another with respect to any element of UK.  Only the information obtained from additional 
investigation could then be used to eliminate elements of UK. 
Given any element x of UK (where UK is finite), x is rejected by a probability distribution Q 
if and only if Q(x) < qM(x).  Consider all probability distributions Q such that Q(x) = qM(x) for all 
elements x of UK but one.  The probability of the exception is the remaining probability required to 
yield  total probability 1.  Take the convex hull of all these distributions as the credal state.  This 
credal state is the same as the so called “epsilon contaminated class” of probabilities” 
characterized by (1-ε)M(x) + εQ(x) where Q is allowed to be any distribution over UK. (Berger and 
Berliner, 1986, 462.)22
Thus, the inquirers X and Y would be entitled to adopt as the set of “permissible prior 
credal probabilities” for use in subsequent investigation the class of those distributions none of 
which would recommend rejecting an element of UK.  Some may complain that the choice of 
priors to count as permissible is dependent on the informational value determining M-function.  I 
respond that making such bias explicit permits us to keep bias under critical control.  Thus, if the 
M-function is uniform over UK, when q = 1, the prior distribution is the uniform distribution; but 
                                                 
22 Berger and Berliner cite several uses of ε-contaminated classes of distributions going back to the 1960’s most but not 
all of which embrace frequentist interpretations rather than credal interpretations of probability.  In Levi, 1980, ch.13.4ff, I 
proposed adoption of a family of prior distributions derived along the lines suggested in the text.  Only much later did 
Teddy Seidenfeld point out to me that the class of unbiased priors as I called them was an ε-contaminated class as 
understood in the robust Bayesian literature.  The difference between my approach and that in the statistical literature is 
that the distribution M I picked out for distinction in defining the class was equated with an informational value determining 
probability characterizing the demands for information appropriate to some problem of inductive expansion.  I avoided 
consideration of “most plausible” distributions that seem to me to be obscure. 
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rather than considering this distribution to be recommended by some principle of insufficient 
reason, it is recognized as the product of the inquirer’s demands for information. 
A more serious difficulty is that the epsilon contaminated family recognizes for each 
element of UK at least one permissible distribution according to which the prior credal probability 
of x is very high so that it becomes difficult to reject x at the given level of boldness for any data 
points unless likelihoods are very decisive.  If this is a genuine objection, it can be remedied in 
several ways by imposing a maximum less than 1 on the value of Q in the formula for epsilon 
contamination. 
Further issues need to be addressed if the M – function is allowed to go indeterminate.  I 
shall not address them here. 
What I mean to emphasize is that efforts to strengthen confirmational commitments may 
be justified in the context of inductive expansion by recommendations that reflect the inquirer’s 
demands for information without being willful or arbitrary in any serious manner.  Moreover, the 
fact that such changes are controlled by interest in inductive expansion points in a direction 
opposite to the one favored by those who wish to avoid the question of justifying changes in 
states of full belief. 
Thus, I claim that just as degree of belief or evidential support in both the maximizing and 
satisficing senses presuppose the context of inductive expansion, in a broad class of cases, 
changes in confirmational commitments are justified in the context of inductive expansion.   
10.The Lockean Thesis and Epiphenomenal Belief. 
Richard Foley’s view is representative of the ideas of many contemporary epistemologists who 
worry about the epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degree of belief.  He advances 
what he calls “The Lockean Thesis”.  
To say that we believe a proposition is just to say that we are confident of its truth for our 
attitude to be one of belief.  Then it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition 
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just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have sufficiently high degree of confidence 
in it to make our attitude towards it one of belief. (Foley, 1992, 111.) 
The notion of degree of belief used here need not be degree of belief in the satisficing 
sense.  Indeed, Foley takes the notion of degree of belief to be degree of credal probability 
almost without argument.  In effect, Foley is following an approach made explicit by H.E.Kyburg a 
long time ago (1961, 1974).  As we have seen, credal probability could not be degree of belief in 
the satisficing sense where probabilities are determinate or indeterminate.  Credal probability in 
the satisficing sense takes high probability to be sufficient for changing states of full belief (and, 
as a consequence states of credal probability judgment) by adding all highly probable 
propositions to the state of full belief.  Since the consequences of such a state (the set of full 
beliefs) should be fully believed, all conjunctions of such full beliefs should also be fully believed.  
Otherwise the state of full belief could not serve as the standard for serious possibility. 
The Lockean Thesis as understood by Foley is interpreted differently.  Relative to the 
initial state of full belief K, proposition h carries a high degree of belief.  Let us say for the sake of 
the argument that it is a high degree of credal probability.  If the degree of belief is high enough, 
the inquirer believes in Foley’s qualitative sense that h relative to K.  The inquirer does not 
change belief state.  The inquirer who believes that h in Foley’s qualitative sense does not fully 
believe that h and does not come to full belief that h.  Qualitative belief in this sense has no clear 
relation with warrant for changing belief.  Rational qualitative belief that h is qualitative belief that 
h supported by the evidence in K just as rational degree of belief that h is degree of belief 
supported by K. 
Qualitative belief so conceived need not be closed under conjunctions just as Kyburg has 
insisted for a long time and Foley echoing Kyburg insists.  In response to the charge that 
qualitative belief as he following Kyburg understands it is merely an epiphenomenal expression of 
degrees of belief, Foley responds that rational qualitative belief is applicable to situations where 
one has three options: bet on h with a one dollar gain if h is true, one dollar loss if h is false, bet 
on ~h for similar terms and refuse to bet with no gain or loss.  One may face the same issue for 
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several probabilistically independent propositions.23  Foley thinks such betting situations are of 
the kind where one might usefully deploy his notion of qualitative belief.  Maybe this is so.  But the 
probabilistic notion whether determinate or not can also be used.  Qualitative belief remains an 
epiphenomenon.   
In any case, rational qualitative belief relative to K cannot be degree of probability relative 
to K above a given threshold.   
10. Plain Belief 
There is a qualitative notion of belief relative to K that is equivalent to degree of belief in 
the satisficing sense above a given threshold relative to K.  Indeed there is an entire family of 
such qualitative notions relative to K parameterized by the index of boldness q.  Begin with the 
notion of plain belief (Spohn, 1990).  Although Spohn’s measures of degrees of belief bear some 
formal similarities to measures of degrees of belief in the satisficing sense, Spohn himself avoids 
concern with inductive expansion or cognate applications of his formalisms.  But this need not 
deter us from pointing out that if his notion of degree of belief is interpreted as degree of belief in 
the satisficing sense, plain belief that h as he defines it becomes positive degree of belief that h in 
the satisficing sense where the latter means that ~h is rejected when the inquirer exercises 
maximum boldness q = 1.  The set of plain beliefs is closed under the consequence relation not 
only when the ultimate partition is finite as I have been assuming here but when the proposals I 
have made elsewhere for extending the inductive expansion rules to countably infinite sets of 
alternatives are deployed.24
                                                 
23 Foley fails to mention the requirement of probabilistic independence that seems appropriate to his intention although 
exemplified (so one may suppose) by his examples. 
24 Levi, 2004, ch.6.2.  The extended inductive expansion rules proposed are guaranteed to avoid inconsistency only if the 
M-function is finitely additive.  These rules are guaranteed to avoid inconsistency when q = 1 only if the credal probability 
over UK  has a maximum value among elements of UK.  The distribution does not have to be countably additive although 
this is not forbidden.  Spohn himself has used another interpretation according to which plain beliefs must receive 
probability 1 in the standard reals.  This approach will insure that the set of plain beliefs will include meets of finite sets of 
plain beliefs but it will not include meets of a countable infinity of plain beliefs.  The approach I favor does.  Consider for 
example a countably infinite lottery where each ticket has the same credal probability of winning and the informational 
value of ticket j winning is the same for all tickets and, hence, M(j) = 0.  On my account, inquirer X should lack plain belief 
in any hypothesis about the outcome of the lottery except the claim that exactly one ticket will be drawn.  On Spohn’s 
view, X should plainly believe that ticket i will not win for each i, should plainly believe that exactly one ticket will win but 
should not believe that no ticket will win.   
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Some plain beliefs relative to K are and some are not full beliefs that are consequences 
of K.  However, if the inquirer is maximally bold in inductive expansion (relative to K, UK,Q, M), X 
should expand from K to the set of propositions that are plainly believed relative to K.  That is to 
say, X’s new set of full beliefs should consist of the plain beliefs relative to K that are 
consequences of K and the set of plain beliefs relative to K that are not consequences of K. 
However, inquirer X may be more cautious and refuse to expand by adding all plain 
beliefs relative to K.  They remain plain beliefs relative to K and, indeed, relative to the set 
expanded at the lower value for q without being fully believed.  So the notion of plain belief or 
belief to a positive degree remains a useful idea. 
In the same manner we can define other qualitative notions under the rubric “belief to a 
degree greater than 1 – q” for each degree of boldness less than 1 except for q = 0 where we 
speak of degree of belief 1. 
Each one of these notions is a qualitative notion of belief relative to K.  With the partial 
exception of the case where q = 0, it represents a qualitative notion distinct from full belief.  But 
with the exercise of degree of boldness q, it also marks the warranted inductive expansion of K.  
It is this circumstance that distinguishes qualitative notions of belief relative to K of this type from 
the epiphenomenal notions used by Kyburg, by Spohn and by Foley. 
10, Conclusion. 
If the argument of this essay has any merit, measures of evidential support in the satisficing and 
maximizing sense have useful application because of the importance of jusitifying changes in 
states of full belief via deliberate, inductive expansion.  Evidential support in the maximizing 
sense is, so I have argued, expected epistemic utility.  Evidential support in the satisficing sense 
is a measure of degree of belief exhibiting the formal structure of a Shackle measure.  Expected 
epistemic utility is rarely considered to license a degree of belief.  Shackle measures, on the other 
hand, are used to determine degrees of belief.  In any case, neither expected epistemic utility nor 
degree of belief in the Shackle sense can be a probability in the sense of the calculus of 
probability.  But we can recognize expectation determining credal probability as a conception of 
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degree of belief.  But this conception too is entangled with the idea of full belief.  In the first place, 
X’s state of credal probability should be a function of X’s state of full belief in accordance with a 
confirmational commitment.  As long as the confirmational commitment remains unchanged, 
changes in credal state are determined by changes in state of full belief.  On the other hand, 
changes in confirmational commitment are often justified by considering how adopting revised 
confirmational commitments would modify the methods used to acquire new full beliefs.  So 
degree of belief as credal probability, like the other notions of degree of belief, requires 
consideration of states of full belief and their modification. 
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